Iran said it will begin enriching uranium beyond limits set in a 2015 nuclear deal, marking the second intentional violation of the multiparty deal and putting it at risk of complete collapse.
Since President Trumppulled out of the pact last year, Tehran has warned it would step up nuclear activities in a bid to raise the pressure on Europe, China and Russia to provide relief from crippling U.S. economic sanctions and to raise costs to Washington of continuing its so-called maximum pressure campaign.
On Sunday, Iran said it would begin making technical changes at its nuclear facilities to start enriching uranium above the 3.67% allowed under the nuclear deal, and surpassing the limit by Monday morning—a move that brings it a small step closer to having fissile material that could be used in an atomic weapon.
“Tomorrow early morning we will have passed over 3.67%,” Behrouz Kamalvandi, spokesman for Iran’s atomic agency, said in a press briefing in Tehran.
He didn’t say to what level Iran would enrich uranium but said that it was to supply fuel to power plants, indicating Iran will initially only enrich at 5% purity.
“If the 3.67% becomes 3.68%, or 4% or 5%, it is not important. This has a political strategic significance,” said Abbas Araghchi, Iran’s deputy foreign minister and a key player in the nuclear negotiations.
Iranian officials said the latest decision wasn’t meant to undermine the nuclear accord, but that it was up to the remaining parties to live up to their commitments.
A top adviser to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei on Saturday had hinted that Iran would increase enrichment only to 5%. Iran has produced up to 20% enriched uranium in the past. Weapons grade uranium is 90%.
Last week, Iran also breached the nuclear deal’s cap on its stockpile of low-enriched uranium.
Two Paths to a Nuclear Bomb
Iran has historically pursued work on both uranium- and plutonium-weapons programs, Western officials say. The 2015 nuclear deal set temporary limits on a wide range of Iran's nuclear work and committed Tehran to never work on nuclear weapons. Here's how these bombs are built and how far down those paths Iran has previously gone.
Creating weapons-grade nuclear fuel
Uranium
Plutonium
Low-grade uranium ore is mined and chemically treated to produce a concentrated yellowcake. After a conversion process, it is fed into centrifuges.
Heavy-water reactors produce plutonium as a waste product. Iran never finished its Arak heavy-water reactor so it never produced plutonium. Under the 2015 deal, it agreed to remove the Arak reactor core and build one that would produce less plutonium.
1
1
Deuterium
oxide
Uranium hexaflouride
Uranium ore
Yellowcake
Natural
uranium
Centrifuges are set up in cascades to enrich the uranium. The sophisticated process can take years to establish. Iran produced around 20,000 basic centrifuges—IR-1s and IR-2ms—but is doing research on more advanced machines.
2
Plutonium waste
Pressurized heavy-water reactor
Control rods
Centrifuges
Pressurizer
Steam
generator
6.9 ft
5.2
Steel pressure vessel
IR-1
IR-2M
Water
Fuel
Enriching uranium to 5% is the most time-consuming part of producing weapons-grade material. Iran on Monday exceeded its permitted 300-kg stockpile of uranium enriched to 3.67%.
3
To create pure plutonium, the plutonium waste is chemically separated and extracted from radioactive spent-fuel assemblies at a reprocessing plant.
2
5% enriched
uranium
It takes roughly 200 kg to 250 kg of 20% enriched uranium to produce the 25 kg of 90% enriched uranium, the amount needed for a bomb. Iran has reached 20% purity in the past but has never enriched above that level. The enriched uranium is converted to uranium metal for weapon use.
4
Reprocessing plant
Pure plutonium
The pure plutonium is melted into a liquid form that is poured into a mold designed for use in a nuclear weapon.
3
20%
90%
Pure plutonium
Plutonium
liquid
Weapon
mold
25kg
200-250 kg
Weaponizing nuclear fuel
Deploying the nuclear fuel in a weapon presents technical challenges, many of which Iran isn’t believed to have mastered. Detonating the weapon requires a fission reaction. The nuclear payload must be attached to a missile, and the payload must be able to withstand reentry through through earth's atmosphere as it descends to its target.
Nuclear payload
Fission reaction
Explosives
Plutonium
Re-entry vehicle
Detonator
Uranium
Initiator
Creating weapons-grade nuclear fuel
Uranium
Plutonium
Low-grade uranium ore is mined and chemically treated to produce a concentrated yellowcake. After a conversion process, it is fed into centrifuges.
Heavy-water reactors produce plutonium as a waste product. Iran never finished its Arak heavy-water reactor so it never produced plutonium. Under the 2015 deal, it agreed to remove the Arak reactor core and build one that would produce less plutonium.
1
1
Uranium ore
Yellowcake
Uranium hexaflouride
Deuterium
oxide
Centrifuges are set up in cascades to enrich the uranium. The sophisticated process can take years to establish. Iran produced around 20,000 basic centrifuges—IR-1s and IR-2ms—but is doing research on more advanced machines.
2
Natural
uranium
Plutonium
waste
Pressurized heavy-water reactor
Control rods
Centrifuges
Pressurizer
Steam
generator
6.9 ft
Steel pressure vessel
Water
Fuel
IR-1
5.2
To create pure plutonium, the plutonium waste is chemically separated and extracted from radioactive spent-fuel assemblies at a reprocessing plant.
2
IR-2M
Enriching uranium to 5% is the most time-consuming part of producing weapons-grade material. Iran on Monday exceeded its permitted 300-kg stockpile of uranium enriched to 3.67%.
3
5% enriched
uranium
Reprocessing plant
Pure plutonium
The pure plutonium is melted into a liquid form that is poured into a mold designed for use in a nuclear weapon.
3
It takes roughly 200 kg to 250 kg of 20% enriched uranium to produce the 25 kg of 90% enriched uranium, the amount needed for a bomb. Iran has reached 20% purity in the past but has never enriched above that level. The enriched uranium is converted to uranium metal for weapon use.
4
Pure plutonium
Plutonium
liquid
Weapon
mold
20%
90%
25kg
Roughly 200-250 kg
Weaponizing nuclear fuel
Deploying the nuclear fuel in a weapon presents technical challenges, many of which Iran isn’t believed to have mastered. Detonating the weapon requires a fission reaction. The nuclear payload must be attached to a missile, and the payload must be able to withstand reentry through through earth's atmosphere as it descends to its target.
Fission reaction
Nuclear payload
Explosives
Plutonium
Re-entry vehicle
Detonator
Uranium
Initiator
Creating weapons-grade nuclear fuel
Plutonium
Uranium
Low-grade uranium ore is mined and chemically treated to produce a concentrated yellowcake. After a conversion process, it is fed into centrifuges.
Heavy-water reactors produce plutonium as a waste product. Iran never finished its Arak heavy-water reactor so it never produced plutonium. Under the 2015 deal, it agreed to remove the Arak reactor core and build one that would produce less plutonium.
1
1
Uranium ore
Yellowcake
Uranium hexaflouride
Centrifuges are set up in cascades to enrich the uranium. The sophisticated process can take years to establish. Iran produced around 20,000 basic centrifuges—IR-1s and IR-2ms—but is doing research on more advanced machines.
2
Deuterium
oxide
Natural
uranium
Plutonium
waste
Pressurized heavy-water reactor
Centrifuges
6.9 ft
Control rods
Pressurizer
Steam
generator
IR-1
Steel pressure vessel
Water
5.2
Fuel
IR-2M
Enriching uranium to 5% is the most time-consuming part of producing weapons-grade material. Iran on Monday exceeded its permitted 300-kg stockpile of uranium enriched to 3.67%.
3
To create pure plutonium, the plutonium waste is chemically separated and extracted from radioactive spent-fuel assemblies at a reprocessing plant.
2
5% enriched
uranium
It takes roughly 200 kg to 250 kg of 20% enriched uranium to produce the 25 kg of 90% enriched uranium, the amount needed for a bomb. Iran has reached 20% purity in the past but has never enriched above that level. The enriched uranium is converted to uranium metal for weapon use.
4
Reprocessing plant
Pure plutonium
The pure plutonium is melted into a liquid form that is poured into a mold designed for use in a nuclear weapon.
3
20%
90%
Pure plutonium
Plutonium
liquid
Weapon
mold
25kg
Roughly 200-250 kg
Weaponizing nuclear fuel
Deploying the nuclear fuel in a weapon presents technical challenges, many of which Iran isn’t believed to have mastered. Detonating the weapon requires a fission reaction. The nuclear payload must be attached to a missile, and the payload must be able to withstand reentry through through earth's atmosphere as it descends to its target.
Nuclear payload
Fission reaction
Explosives
Plutonium
Re-entry vehicle
Detonator
Uranium
Initiator
Iran has historically pursued work on both uranium- and plutonium-weapons programs, Western officials say. The 2015 nuclear deal set temporary limits on a wide range of Iran's nuclear work and committed Tehran to never work on nuclear weapons. Here's how these bombs are built and how far down those paths Iran has previously gone.
Creating weapons-grade nuclear fuel
Uranium
Low-grade uranium ore is mined and chemically treated to produce a concentrated yellowcake. After a conversion process, it is fed into centrifuges.
1
Uranium ore
Yellowcake
Uranium hexaflouride
Centrifuges are set up in cascades to enrich the uranium. The sophisticated process can take years to establish. Iran produced around 20,000 basic centrifuges—IR-1s and IR-2ms—but is doing research on more advanced machines.
2
Centrifuges
6.9 ft
5.2
IR-1
IR-2M
Enriching uranium to 5% is the most time-consuming part of producing weapons-grade material. Iran on Monday exceeded its permitted 300-kg stockpile of uranium enriched to 3.67%.
3
5% enriched
uranium
It takes roughly 200 kg to 250 kg of 20% enriched uranium to produce the 25 kg of 90% enriched uranium, the amount needed for a bomb. Iran has reached 20% purity in the past but has never enriched above that level. The enriched uranium is converted to uranium metal for weapon use.
4
20%
90%
25kg
Roughly 200-250 kg
Plutonium
Heavy-water reactors produce plutonium as a waste product. Iran never finished its Arak heavy-water reactor so it never produced plutonium. Under the 2015 deal, it agreed to remove the Arak reactor core and build one that would produce less plutonium.
1
Deuterium
oxide
Natural
uranium
Plutonium
waste
Pressurized heavy-water reactor
Control rods
Pressurizer
Steam
generator
Steel pressure vessel
Water
Fuel
To create pure plutonium, the plutonium waste is chemically separated and extracted from radioactive spent-fuel assemblies at a reprocessing plant.
2
Reprocessing plant
Pure plutonium
The pure plutonium is melted into a liquid form that is poured into a mold designed for use in a nuclear weapon.
3
Pure plutonium
Plutonium
liquid
Weapon
mold
Weaponizing nuclear fuel
Deploying the nuclear fuel in a weapon presents technical challenges, many of which Iran isn’t believed to have mastered. Detonating the weapon requires a fission reaction. The nuclear payload must be attached to a missile, and the payload must be able to withstand reentry through through earth's atmosphere as it descends to its target.
Fission reaction
Explosives
Plutonium
Detonator
Uranium
Initiator
Nuclear payload
Re-entry vehicle
Roque Ruiz/THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
Iran’s brinkmanship could present President Trump, who has spoken out against U.S. involvement in Middle East conflicts, with difficult questions of war and peace as he prepares for the 2020 elections.
The U.S. on Friday summoned a special session of the board of the International Atomic Energy Agency to consider Iran’s actions, which will take place on July 10. Washington may push for a formal censure of Tehran. The Vienna-based agency oversees Iran’s obligations under the 2015 deal.
“The international community must hold Iran’s regime accountable,” the U.S. said in a statement on Friday.
A spokesman for the United Nations atomic agency said inspectors will be checking to see if Iran goes over the 3.67% limit.
“IAEA inspectors in Iran will report to our headquarters as soon as they verify the announced development,” he said.
Sunday’s statement dashed European hopes that Iran would move only gradually to breach the accord’s limits. Some diplomats had initially hoped that Iran would take months to move clearly in violation of the agreement. Still, with Iran only increasing its uranium stockpile and enrichment levels gradually, it will strengthen those voices in Europe saying there is still time for diplomacy.
European officials have said they may trigger a dispute procedure in the 2015 accord if Iran continues to breach its obligations. That would start a weekslong process that could end with international sanctions being reimposed on Tehran.
Sunday’s move marks the end of a 60-day deadline issued by Iran in May, when it said it would cease to abide by certain commitments under the nuclear deal if European nations didn’t do more to help offset the economic impact of U.S. sanctions.
Mr. Araghchi said Foreign Minister Javad Zarif on Sunday sent a letter to European Union foreign policy chief Federica Mogherini stating the latest step and issuing another 60-day deadline to take further action, but he didn’t disclose what those measures would be.
French President Emmanuel Macron spoke with Iranian President Hassan Rouhani on Saturday and said he was deeply concerned about Tehran’s weakening of the nuclear accord, and “the consequences that would necessarily follow,” according to a statement from the French president.
Messrs. Macron and Rouhani also agreed to explore by July 15 the conditions for a resumption of talks between the remaining parties to the nuclear agreement, the statement said.
Asked about the prospect of the U.S. joining in the talks, Mr. Araghchi said, “If the U.S. wants to take part in talks, on the condition of lifting its sanctions, it is possible in our view.”
Tightened American sanctions have reduced Iranian oil exports by about 90%, causing severe ripple effects across the country’s economy, and driving Tehran to adopt a more confrontational stance.
In addition to the nuclear activities, the U.S. has accused Iran of attacking oil tankers and Saudi oil facilities—charges that Iran denies. In June, Iran shot down an American spy drone.
Once 5% enrichment is reached, the jump to 90%-enriched weapons-grade uranium is relatively straightforward.
Nuclear experts say somewhere around 200 to 250 kilograms of 20%-enriched uranium, when further enriched to 90%, is enough to fuel one nuclear weapon. In 2013, shortly before an interim deal was struck, Iran had produced 196 kilograms of the material. That stockpile was sent abroad or diluted into harmless material under the 2015 agreement.
Nonetheless, the steps Iran has taken so far don’t significantly impact on Iran’s breakout time—how long it would take Tehran to produce enough fissile material for one nuclear bomb. The nuclear deal was crafted to ensure Iran’s breakout time was at least a year.
Notably, Iran has steered clear of actions or threats to other key parts of the nuclear deal. Western diplomats say Iran has, for the most part, allowed timely inspections of nuclear-related facilities by the IAEA’s monitors.
It has also, crucially, not threatened to disregard limits on the number and type of centrifuges it deploys to enrich uranium, a critical component of maintaining the one-year breakout time.
Under the deal, Iran was required to remove and place in storage two-thirds of its close to 20,000 centrifuges, most of which were basic machines of a type used decades ago in Western countries. Iran also placed in storage around 1,000 somewhat more advanced machines.
Were Iran to reinstall all its centrifuges or add more advanced ones, it could significantly reduce the time needed to produce a nuclear weapon to below one year, a threshold Trump administration officials say they are closely monitoring.
Related
- U.S. Calls for Special Meeting of U.N. Atomic Agency Over Iran (July 5, 2019)
- Iran Says It Breached Nuclear-Deal Limits on Enriched Uranium (July 1, 2019)
- U.S. Plans New Iran Sanctions as Europe Tries to Defuse Tensions (June 23, 2019)
- Trump Withdraws U.S. From Iran Accord (May 8, 2018)
Iranian officials on Sunday said increasing the number of centrifuges wasn’t necessary for now.
“We don’t need to increase centrifuges,” Mr. Kamalvandi said. “Adding centrifuges is an option the country’s senior officials can choose.”
Write to Sune Engel Rasmussen at sune.rasmussen@wsj.com and Laurence Norman at laurence.norman@wsj.com
2019-07-07 07:26:00Z
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